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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Police Investigator Anthony DeLello was called to the scene of a burglary on 
May 22, 1997.  He found tire tracks leading from the scene to Steve Samek’s 
property.  DeLello then obtained a warrant and searched Samek’s home.  As the 
police were preparing to leave Samek’s house at the conclusion of the search, Samek 
arrived home in a van driven by his friend Douglas Jacobsen.  Police arrested Samek 
when several of the items stolen in the burglary were found in the back of the van.  
Jacobsen was not arrested and later implicated Samek in the burglary.  Two days 
later, Samek’s wife gave police an audiotape (the “Tape”) of a male voice confessing 
to the burglary.  Based upon the contents of the Tape, DeLello formed the belief that 
the person speaking on the Tape was Jacobsen.  DeLello then gave the Tape to 
prosecutor Edward Barce.  DeLello told Barce his belief that the speaker was 
Jacobsen and played the Tape for Barce.  Barce then instructed DeLello not to place 
the Tape into evidence.  Barce did not tell DeLello to destroy the Tape.  Neither 
Barce nor DeLello can remember whether DeLello took the Tape with him or left it 
with Barce.  The Tape was never found after this meeting.  Jacobsen cannot be 
located and is assumed to have fled.2 
Samek filed a motion to dismiss the charges against him claiming that the State’s 
failure to preserve exculpatory evidence in the form of the Tape violated his 
constitutional right to due process.3  Samek’s due process claim is governed by two 
Supreme Court cases, California v. Trombetta4 and Arizona v. Youngblood,5 which 
“set out the test . . . to determine when the government’s failure to preserve evidence 
rises to the level of a due process violation.”6  
                                                                
2These facts are based upon Samek v. State, 688 N.E.2d 1286 (Ind. App. 1997), reh’g 
denied (Feb. 19, 1998). 
3U.S. CONST. amend V. (“[N]or shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law . . . .”); U.S. CONST. amend XIV, 1 (“[N]or shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law . . . .”). 
4467 U.S. 479 (1984) [hereinafter Trombetta]. 
5488 U.S. 51 (1988) [hereinafter Youngblood]. 
6United States v. Cooper, 983 F.2d 928, 931 (9th Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Cooper]. 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol48/iss2/6
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Cases like defendant Samek’s, which require due process analysis of the 
government’s failure to preserve evidence, routinely arise.7  It is well settled that 
Trombetta and Youngblood govern analysis of these cases.8  Despite this agreement, 
                                                                
7For example, some of the cases requiring Trombetta and Youngblood analysis that arose 
during 1998 include: United States v. Wilson, No. 97-1298, 1998 WL 538119 (2d Cir. Mar. 
13, 1998); United States v. Sofidiya, No. 97-4681, 1998 WL 743597 (4th Cir. Oct. 23, 1998); 
Little v. Johnson, No. 98-40240, 1998 WL 853027 (5th Cir. Dec. 10, 1998); Irby v. DeTella,  
No. 97-1797, 1998 WL 796064 (7th Cir. Nov. 9, 1998); United States v. Garcia, No. 97-
50576, 1998 WL 568052 (9th Cir. Aug. 26, 1998); United States v. Andreas, No. 96 CR 762, 
1998 WL 214666 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 22, 1998); Otsuki v. Dubois, 994 F. Supp. 47 (D. Mass. Feb. 
5, 1998); State v. Gaston, No. L-97-1170, 1998 WL 833556 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 4, 1998); 
State v. Leggett, No. WM-97-029, 1998 WL 614553 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 4, 1998); People v. 
Frye, 18 Cal. 4th 894 (Cal. 1998); Robinson v. State, No. 04-97-00392-CR, 1998 WL 236324 
(Tex. Ct. App. May 13, 1998); State v. Hawkins, 958 P.2d 22 (Idaho Ct. App. 1998); Hawkins 
v. State, 964 S.W.2d 767 (Tex. App. Beaumont 1998). 
8Trombetta and Youngblood govern all due process claims that arise under the federal 
constitution.  See generally Cooper, 983 F.2d at 931.  A majority of state courts also apply 
Trombetta and Youngblood to due process claims arising under their state constitutions (or 
they do not differentiate between the standards that apply to state and federal claims and apply 
Trombetta and Youngblood to both).  See State v. Walden, 905 P.2d 974 (Ariz. 1995); Wenzel 
v. State, 815 S.W.2d 938 (Ark. 1991); State v. Walker, 914 P.2d 1320 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); 
People v. Beeler, 891 P.2d 153, 166 (Cal. 1995), overruled in part by Calderon v. United 
States, 163 F.3d 530 (1998) and EgoAguirre v. White, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3162 (1999); 
People v. Smith, 926 P.2d 186 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Bock, 659 So. 2d 1196 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Walker v. State, 449 S.E.2d 845 (Ga. 1994); Stuart v. State, 907 P.2d 
783 (Idaho 1995); People v. Pecoraro, 677 N.E.2d 875 (Ill. 1997); Bivins v. State, 642 N.E.2d 
928 (Ind. 1994); Taylor v. State, 834 P.2d 1325 (Kan. 1992) (overruled on other grounds by 
State v. Rice, 932 P.2d 981 (Kan. 1997); Collins v. Commonwealth, 951 S.W.2d 569 (Ky. 
1997); State v. Schexnayder, 685 So. 2d 357 (La. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Berkley, 567 A.2d 
915 (Me. 1989); People v. Huttenga, 493 N.W.2d 486 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992); Holland v. 
State, 587 So. 2d 848 (Miss. 1991); State v. Richard, 798 S.W.2d 468 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); 
State v. Peterson, 494 N.W.2d 551 (Neb. 1993); People v. Scattareggia, 152 A.D.2d 679 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1989); State v. Robinson, 488 S.E.2d 174 (N.C. 1997); State v. Estep, 598 N.E.2d 
96 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991); Torres v. State, 962 P.2d 3 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998); State v. 
Hendershott, 887 P.2d 351 (Or. Ct. App. 1994); Commonwealth v. Moss, 689 A.2d 259 (Pa. 
1997); State v. Garcia, 643 A.2d 180 (R.I. 1994); State v. Jackson, 396 S.E.2d 101 (S.C. 
1990); State v. Arguello, 502 N.W.2d 548 (S.D. 1993); State v. Eldridge, 951 S.W.2d 775 
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1997); State v. Rudd, 871 S.W.2d 530 (Tx. Ct. App. 1994); State v. 
Holden, 964 P.2d 318 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); Mullins v. Commonwealth, No. 1250-94-3, 1996 
WL 343953 (Va. Ct. App. June 25, 1996); State v. Copeland, 922 P.2d 1304 (Wash. 1996); 
State v. Greenwold, 525 N.W.2d 294 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994); Gale v. State, 792 P.2d 570 (Wyo. 
1990).  
A minority of states have either rejected the Trombetta/Youngblood approach because of 
concerns that the bad faith requirement doesn=t adequately guarantee due process, see infra 
note 70, and apply a balancing test approach to analysis of due process claims arising under 
their state constitutions, or, apply Trombetta and Youngblood along with additional criteria or 
factors. See ex parte Gingo, 605 So. 2d 1237 (Ala. 1992); Thorne v. Department of Public 
Safety, 774 P.3d 1326, 1330 n.9 (Alaska 1989); State v. Morales, 657 A.2d 585 (Conn. 1995); 
Brown v. United States, 1998 WL 422676 (D.C. 1998); Hammond v. State, 569 A.2d 81 (Del. 
1989); State v. Matafeo, 787 P.2d 671 (Haw. 1990); State v. Hulbert, 481 N.W.2d 329 (Iowa 
1992); State v. Schmid, 487 N.W.2d 539 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); Commonwealth v. 
Henderson, 582 N.E.2d 496 (Mass. 1991); State v. Halter, 777 P.2d 1313 (Mont. 1989); 
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2000
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however, courts frequently botch their application of Trombetta and Youngblood.  
Hoping to prevent future blunders, this Article identifies three mistakes that courts 
commonly make when applying Trombetta and Youngblood and seeks to clarify 
Trombetta and Youngblood’s proper application.  As preparation for the discussion, 
this Article introduces the Trombetta and Youngblood cases.  Trombetta and 
Youngblood are then applied to defendant Samek’s situation in an attempt to discern 
whether he has a sound due process claim.  The uncertainties that arise in this 
application justify examination of three specific questions.  Part I of this Article 
examines the first question, what does it mean for evidence to have “apparent 
exculpatory value?”  Part II of this Article answers the second question, when does 
Youngblood’s bad faith requirement apply in failure to preserve evidence cases? Part 
III then seeks to determine the substance of Youngblood’s bad faith requirement and 
identify the best approach to defining it.  Ultimately, this Article argues that there are 
three common mistakes that courts make when applying Trombetta and Youngblood.  
These mistakes are made because the answers to the three questions explored in Parts 
I through III are confused, ignored, or unclear.  To avoid making these mistakes in 
the future, courts applying Trombetta and Youngblood must first correctly examine 
evidence to determine whether it has “apparent exculpatory value,” focusing on 
whether any exculpatory value was apparent and recognizing that evidence does not 
need to exonerate a defendant to meet this standard.  Second, courts must apply 
Youngblood’s bad faith requirement to all failure to preserve evidence cases.  
Finally, courts must adopt the rebuttable presumption approach as the best method 
for defining bad faith. 
II.  CALIFORNIA V. TROMBETTA 
When stopped on suspicion of drunken driving on California highways, 
Trombetta submitted to an Intoxilyzer9 test which revealed a blood alcohol 
concentration higher than the legal limit in California.  Accordingly, Trombetta was 
charged with driving while intoxicated.  Prior to Trial, Trombetta filed a motion to 
suppress the results of the Intoxilyzer test on the grounds that the police had failed to 
preserve the breath samples.  Trombetta claimed that “had a breath sample been 
preserved, he would have been able to impeach the incriminating Intoxilyzer 
results.”10   
Rejecting Trombetta’s motion, the Court found that a State only has a duty to 
preserve evidence that is constitutionally material.  “To meet this standard of 
constitutional materiality, . . . evidence must both possess an exculpatory value that 
was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the 
defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably 
                                                          
Keener v. State, 850 P.3d 311 (Nev. 1993); State v. Smagula, 578 A.2d 1215 (N.H. 1990); 
State v. Dreher, 695 A.2d 672 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997); State v. Barnett, 543 N.W.2d 
774 (N.D. 1996); State v. Delisle, 648 A.2d 632 (Vt. 1994); State v. Osakalumi, 461 S.E.2d 
504 (W. Va. 1995). Finally, I was unable to locate any Maryland cases that consider this issue 
post-Youngblood. 
9
“The Omicron Intoxilyzer . . . is a device used in California to measure the concentration 
of alcohol in the blood of motorists suspected of driving while under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor.”  Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 481. 
10Id. at 483. 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol48/iss2/6
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available means.”11  The Intoxilyzer evidence failed both prongs of the materiality 
test.  It did not possess exculpatory value; “the chances [were] extremely low that 
preserved samples would have been exculpatory,”12 and “were much more likely to 
provide inculpatory . . . evidence.”13  Trombetta also had “alternative means of 
demonstrating [his] innocence.”14  
The Court’s articulation of the constitutional materiality test was preceded by a 
discussion of specific facts present in Trombetta which contributed to its 
determination that “the State’s failure to retain breath samples  . . . [does not 
constitute] a violation of the Federal Constitution.”15  First, “California authorities in 
this case did not destroy [the] breath samples in a calculated effort to circumvent the 
disclosure requirements established by Brady v. Maryland and its progeny.”16  
Second, “the officers . . . were acting ‘in good faith and in accord with their normal 
practice.’”17  Third, there was no allegation of “official animus towards [Trombetta] 
or of a conscious effort to suppress exculpatory evidence.”18  Finally, “California’s 
policy of not preserving breath samples [was] without constitutional defect.”19 
III.  ARIZONA V. YOUNGBLOOD 
A young boy was kidnapped, molested and sexually assaulted.  The hospital 
which treated the boy following the ordeal used a “sexual assault kit” to collect 
evidence of the attack.  The evidence was then turned over to the police who placed 
the kit in a secure refrigerator.  The police also collected the boy’s underwear and T-
shirt but these items were not refrigerated.  The police criminologist found semen 
                                                                
11Id. at 489. 
12Id. 
13Id. 
14Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 490. Trombetta could have challenged the reliability of the 
Intoxilyzer machine or cross-examined the police officer who administered the Intoxilyzer 
test. Id.  
15Id. at 488. 
16Id; see also Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) [hereinafter Brady], held that upon 
the request of a criminal defendant, the State has a duty to disclose evidence material to guilt 
or punishment. If the State does not do this, due process is violated . . . .”  The extent of the 
Brady guarantee was subsequently expanded by United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976), 
which held that the State has an absolute duty to disclose to criminal defendants evidence 
material to their guilt or innocence even in the absence of a specific request. 
17Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488 (citing Killian v. United States, 368 U.S. 231 (1961)). In 
Killian v. United States, the Court held that destruction of a police officer’s preliminary notes 
did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.  “If the agents’ notes . . . were made only 
for the purpose of transferring the data thereon . . . , and if, having served that purpose, they 
were destroyed by the agents in good faith and in accord with their normal practices, it would 
be clear that their destruction did not constitute an impermissible destruction of evidence . . . .” 
Id. at 242 (emphasis added). 
18Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488. 
19Id. 
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stains on the underwear and T-shirt but was unable to successfully test them because 
the stains had not been properly preserved.   
Larry Youngblood was convicted by a jury of the kidnapping, child molestation 
and sexual assault.  His principal defense was that the boy (victim) misidentified him 
as the perpetrator.  Apparently, Youngblood claimed that had the semen stains on the 
boy’s clothing been properly preserved, test results might have completely 
exonerated him.  Rejecting this argument, the Court, after discussing Trombetta,20 
found that “unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, 
failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due 
process of law.”21 While bad faith is not a consideration when the State fails to 
disclose material exculpatory evidence, “the Due Process Clause requires a different 
result when we deal with the failure of the State to preserve evidentiary material of 
which no more can be said than that it could have been subjected to tests, the results 
of which might have exonerated the defendant.”22 
The purpose of the bad faith requirement is to “limit[] the extent of the police’s 
obligation to preserve evidence to reasonable bounds and confine[] it to that class of 
cases where the interests of justice most clearly require it, i.e., those cases in which 
the police themselves by their conduct indicate that the evidence could form a basis 
for exonerating the defendant.” The Court did not explicitly define bad faith.  Other 
than the purpose statement above, their main indication of the substance of bad faith 
comes in a footnote.  “The presence or absence of bad faith by the police for 
purposes of the Due Process Clause must necessarily turn on the police’s knowledge 
of the exculpatory value of the evidence at the time it was lost or destroyed.”23  
Like the Court in Trombetta, the Court in Youngblood articulated specific facts 
which contributed to its holding.  First, “[t]he failure of the police to refrigerate the 
clothing and to perform tests on the semen samples can at worst be described as 
negligent.”24 Second, the police’s failure to refrigerate the sample and the sample’s 
subsequent resistance to testing was not concealed from Youngblood.  Finally, the 
Court relied on a lower court’s note that factually, “there was no suggestion of bad 
faith on the part of the police.”25  Justice Stevens’ concurring opinion in Youngblood 
also identified as critical the fact that “at the time the police failed to refrigerate the 
victim’s clothing . . . they had at least as great an interest in preserving the evidence 
as did the person later accused of the crime.”26  
                                                                
20The Youngblood Court described the holding in Trombetta as based on three premises. 
First, that the officers were acting “in good faith and in accord with their normal practice;” 
second, that the chances that the preserved samples would have exculpated the defendants 
were slim, and third, that the defendants had “alternative means of demonstrating their 
innocence.” Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 56. 
21Id. at 58. 
22Id. at 57. 
23Id. at 56 n.*. 
24Id. at 58. 
25Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 51. 
26Id. at 59 (Stevens, J., concurring).  Justice Stevens identified two other factors which, 
post-trial, are helpful to analysis of a Youngblood claim.  First, Justice Stevens found it 
“unlikely that the defendant was prejudiced by the State’s omission.”  Id.  This was because 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol48/iss2/6
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IV.  APPLICATION OF TROMBETTA 
Applying Trombetta’s constitutional materiality test to Samek, the critical inquiry 
is into the exculpatory value of the lost Tape.  There are two tenable responses to this 
inquiry.  On one hand, it seems clear that the lost Tape had apparent exculpatory 
value.  Both DeLello and Barce had the opportunity to hear the Tape prior to its loss.  
They were aware that the Tape contained a confession to the burglary for which 
Samek had been arrested.  They believed that the confessor was Jacobsen.  If 
Jacobsen committed the burglary, this would tend to clear Samek from fault.  On the 
other hand, it is possible to conclude that the Tape was not exculpatory evidence, but 
rather, was merely “potentially useful evidence.”27 The mere fact that a person other 
than Samek confessed to the burglary does not necessarily tend to clear him from 
guilt.  First, the confessor merely said that he, himself, committed the burglary.  The 
confessor did not say that Samek did not commit the burglary.28 This is particularly 
significant given the possibility that Samek and Jacobsen committed the crime 
together; they were together when the police arrested Samek and they were both in 
the van carrying the burgled items.  Second, the confessor on the Tape did not 
identify himself.29  Though DeLello believed that the confessor was Jacobsen, this 
belief was mere speculation at the time the Tape was lost.  Next, the circumstances 
surrounding the making of the Tape were unknown.30  Samek’s wife delivered the 
Tape.  She did not explain how or why she was in possession of the Tape.  She made 
no statement as to her belief in the authenticity of the Tape.  At the time of its loss, 
DeLello’s belief in the Tape’s authenticity was not grounded in objective fact.31  
Unfortunately, the Court in Trombetta offers little guidance as to the definition of 
“exculpatory” as used in its rule or the distinction (if any32) between exculpatory and 
potentially exculpatory evidence.  As a result, it is necessary to address the issue of 
what constitutes exculpatory evidence under Trombetta. 
                                                          
the trial court instructed the jury: “If you find that the State has . . . allowed to be destroyed or 
lost any evidence whose content or quality are in issue, you may infer that the true fact is 
against the State’s interest.”  Id.  Second, Stevens concluded that “the fact that no juror chose 
to draw the permissive inference that proper preservation of the evidence would have 
demonstrated that the defendant was not the assailant suggest(s) that the lost evidence was 
immaterial.  Id. at 60.  These two factors are not helpful to a pre-trial analysis of a Youngblood 
claim. 
27This was the conclusion of the Indiana Court of Appeals in Samek v. State, 688 N.E.2d 




31This Article proceeds on the assumption that the Tape would be admissible at trial. It is 
important to note, however, that there is a potential hearsay problem with the Tape.  See 
Indiana Rules of Evidence, Article VIII. Hearsay; see also Samek, 688 N.E.2d at 1287 (noting 
that the trial court granted a motion stating that the Tape was inadmissible hearsay). 
32In many instances it is unclear whether courts use and/or quote “potentially exculpatory 
evidence” in an effort to distinguish it from the sort of exculpatory value required by 
Trombetta or whether it is a term is sufficient to satisfy Trombetta’s materiality requirement. 
See infra Part I. 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2000
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V.  APPLICATION OF YOUNGBLOOD 
Seeking to determine whether Samek represents one of those cases where “the 
police themselves by their conduct indicate that the evidence could form a basis for 
exonerating the defendant,”33 the critical inquiry is whether  DeLello and/or Barce 
acted in bad faith in failing to preserve the lost Tape.  There are several tenable 
responses to this inquiry.  
Youngblood emphasizes the connection between the presence of bad faith and 
“the police’s knowledge of the exculpatory value of the evidence at the time it was 
lost or destroyed.”34  Apparently, if police know that evidence has exculpatory value 
and that evidence is subsequently lost then this is prima facie evidence35 of bad faith.  
One response to the bad faith inquiry then, is that because Barce and DeLello knew 
that the Tape had either exculpatory value or at least potential exculpatory value36 
prior to the loss of the Tape, Youngblood requires a conclusive finding that bad faith 
was present.37  Another response is that Barce and DeLello’s loss of evidence which 
they knew had exculpatory value creates a rebuttable presumption that they acted in 
bad faith.38  A final response is that bad faith is simply not present;39 Samek offered 
no independent facts or evidence sufficient to allow the Court to find that Barce or 
DeLello acted in bad faith. 
The factors discussed by the Youngblood majority are not particularly helpful to 
an assessment of which of the above responses is most consistent with the Court’s 
intent.  A main reason for this is the fact that, at the time of loss, both DeLello and 
Barce had listened to the Tape and knew that it contained a confession to the 
burglary and had reason to think that the confessor was not the defendant.  By 
contrast, the police in Youngblood did not know that there were semen stains on the 
boy’s underwear or T-Shirt when they collected them and they further did not know 
the significance of those stains (i.e. whether, once tested, they would tend to 
inculpate or exculpate defendant).  Barce and DeLello’s awareness of the content and 
potential value of the Tape magnifies the significance of footnote * and its 
conclusion that “the presence . . . of bad faith . . . must necessarily turn on the 
police’s knowledge of the exculpatory value of the evidence.”  
Looking specifically at the factors that the Youngblood Court considered, Barce 
and DeLello’s awareness of the value of the Tape further  makes a conclusion that its 
loss was the result of “mere negligence” more difficult than was the same 
determination in Youngblood.  This awareness also precludes a finding that at the 
time the Tape was lost the police “had at least as great an interest in preserving the 
                                                                
33Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58. 
34Id. at 56 n.*. 
35Prima facie evidence is “[e]vidence good and sufficient on its face.  Such evidence . . . is 
sufficient to establish a given fact, . . . which if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain 
sufficient.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1190 (6th ed. 1990).   
36See infra Part I applying Trombetta to Samek and discussing whether the lost Tape had 
exculpatory value or potential exculpatory value. 
37See infra Part III.A. 
38See infra Part III.B. 
39See infra Part III.C. 
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evidence” as did Samek.  Barce and DeLello presumably had sufficient evidence to 
support, at minimum, Samek’s arrest for the burglary.  If the Tape had turned out to 
be insignificant (i.e. it was later determined to be a fabrication or to have no 
evidentiary value) their case would be in the same position as it was before the Tape 
appeared.  On the other hand, if the Tape were admitted into evidence at trial, it 
could significantly weaken their case.  
VI.  WHAT CONSTITUTES APPARENT EXCULPATORY VALUE? 
Exculpatory evidence “tends to justify, excuse or clear the defendant from 
alleged fault or guilt.”40  Therefore, any evidence that “tends to justify, excuse or 
clear the defendant from alleged fault or guilt” has exculpatory value.  Exculpatory 
value is apparent when this value is “obvious, evident, or manifest.”41  Though these 
definitions may appear straightforward,42 courts mistakenly apply the concept of 
“apparent exculpatory value” on a regular basis.  Many of these mistakes stem from 
an undefined distinction between evidence with “apparent exculpatory value” and 
evidence with “potential exculpatory value.”43  This unclear distinction is further 
confused by the fact that courts each seem to define “apparent exculpatory value” 
and “potential exculpatory value” differently.  By in large, courts have failed to 
clarify their use of these terms.  As a result, different courts dealing with the same 
piece of evidence apply different labels to it and arrive at different conclusions as to 
whether it satisfies Trombetta’s “apparent exculpatory value” requirement.  To 
resolve the confusion, I rely on the black letter definitions provided above and then 
look to various discussions and determinations of “apparent exculpatory value.”  
A.  Evidence Which Has Been Tested and Appears to be Inculpatory 
Evidence which has been examined or tested by government agents and appears 
to be inculpatory evidence does not have apparent exculpatory value.44  Such 
evidence is “not expected to play a significant role in the suspect’s defense” as “the 
chances are extremely low that [the] preserved [evidence] would have been 
exculpatory.”45  
The breath samples in Trombetta provide an example of evidence that has been 
tested and appears to have only inculpatory value.  The Intoxilyzer twice analyzed 
samples of Trombetta’s breath.  Trombetta registered a blood-alcohol concentration 
higher than the legal limit.  Given the reading of the Intoxilyzer there was nothing 
that would have suggested to the police officer who performed the tests that the 
                                                                
40BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 566 (6th ed. 1990). 
41Id. at 96. 
42The Trombetta and Youngblood courts seem to have understood what they meant when 
they used these term “apparent exculpatory value.”  Had they been confused or anticipated 
that the term would cause confusion, it seems likely that they would have provided some 
explicit definition beyond the standard and commonly used definition. 
43See infra Part I.E. 
44See generally Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489-90. 
45Id. at 489. 
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breath samples might in any way exculpate Trombetta.  The breath samples therefore 
did not have apparent exculpatory value. 
The breath samples in Trombetta were tested and appeared inculpatory.  By 
contrast, the Tape lost by Barce and DeLello was examined and was not inculpatory.  
Instead, it appeared to be exculpatory in nature.  As a result, the reasoning applied to 
the destroyed breath samples in Trombetta does not apply to the lost Tape in Samek. 
B.  Evidence Which Could Have Been Subjected to Tests Which Might Have 
Exonerated Defendant 
Evidence that has not been examined or tested by government agents provides a 
prime example of evidence that does not have apparent exculpatory value.46  
“Trombetta speaks of evidence whose exculpatory value is ‘apparent.’ . . . . The 
possibility that . . . samples could have exculpated [defendant] if preserved or tested 
is not enough to satisfy the standard.”47 
The stains on the boy’s clothing in Youngblood are an example of the sort of 
evidence “of which no more can be said than that it could have been subjected to 
tests, the results of which might have exonerated the defendant.”48  Because the 
stains were not tested prior to their degradation, there was no way of knowing 
whether the stains tended to implicate or exculpate defendant Youngblood.49  
The lost Tape in Samek is not like the lost stains in Youngblood.  While 
government agents in Youngblood had no awareness at all of any sort of exculpatory 
value in stains on the boy’s clothing, Barce and DeLello knew the contents of the 
Tape and were fully aware that it had value to Samek.  
C.  Evidence Whose Possible Exculpatory Value is Apparent Prior to its Loss or 
Destruction 
Evidence whose exculpatory value is suggested to or recognized by government 
agents may qualify under Trombetta as having apparent exculpatory value.  In 
United States v. Cooper50 government agents seized laboratory equipment from 
Cooper, a suspected methamphetamine manufacturer.  Cooper immediately told 
government agents that the equipment was used in his legitimate chemical 
manufacturing business and was neither capable of nor configured to produce 
methamphetamine.  Government agents knew that Cooper did have a legitimate 
chemical manufacturing business.  Independent experts later testified that were the 
equipment configured as Cooper said, it would not have been capable of producing 
methamphetamine.  Before the equipment was examined it was destroyed as part of 
routine procedure.  The Court concluded that the equipment’s exculpatory value was 
                                                                
46See generally Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 51. 
47Id. at 56 n.*. 
48Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57. 
49Id. at 54-55. 
50983 F.2d 928 (9th Cir. 1993).  It is useful to note that Cooper is one of the few (if not the 
only) published case where the court successfully concluded that the lost evidence had 
exculpatory value.  Interestingly, this conclusion came after the government failed to 
challenge the district court’s same determination about the value of the evidence. 
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apparent before destruction.51  Following Cooper, evidence need not be “certain” to 
exonerate a defendant to qualify as having “exculpatory value” under Trombetta.  
This conclusion is affirmed by the Court’s explicit reference to the destroyed lab 
equipment’s value as “potentially exculpatory evidence.”52 
The facts in Samek are somewhat similar to those in Cooper.  In the same way 
that the government agents in Cooper knew about the value of the equipment to 
Cooper, it is clear that Barce and DeLello, having heard the burglary confession on 
the Tape, knew of its value to Samek.  Though it is not certain that the Tape would 
have exonerated Samek–the facts may have born out that Samek and Jacobsen 
committed the crime together–there is little argument that the Tape would have 
tended to cast some doubt on Samek’s guilt.  As a result, the Tape had apparent 
exculpatory value.53  
D.  Evidence that will Certainly Exonerate a Defendant 
Evidence that will certainly exonerate a defendant necessarily qualifies as having 
exculpatory value.  It is this sort of evidence that most clearly satisfies Trombetta’s 
requirement.  There are, however, no discoverable cases where the exculpatory value 
of lost or destroyed evidence has been this clear.54  Ultimately, it must be admitted 
that once evidence is lost, its exculpatory value can rarely, if ever, be conclusively 
                                                                
51Id. at 931. 
52Id. 
53Despite my conclusion that the Tape does have exculpatory value, I would be remiss if I 
did not note that the Indiana Court of Appeals held otherwise in Samek v. State, 688 N.E.2d 
1286, 1289 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).  As explained in my analysis, I disagree with their 
conclusion. One of the few cases that contains an investigation of the meaning of “exculpatory 
value,” the Court in Samek first looked to Black’s Law dictionary defining evidence with 
exculpatory value as evidence that “tends to justify, excuse or clear the defendant from alleged 
fault or guilt.”  Supra note 39.  Working from this definition, I find it difficult to believe that 
an objective court would conclude that a taped confession of a man other than the defendant 
would not “tend to clear the defendant from alleged fault or guilt.”  If evidence like the lost 
Tape does not meet this requirement, I find it difficult to imagine lost or destroyed evidence 
that would ever meet this requirement.  
After defining exculpatory value, the Court then distinguished an Indiana Supreme Court 
case, Bivins v. State, 642 N.E.2d 928 (Ind. 1994) (holding that a tape recording of a 
defendant’s preliminary advisements was material evidence where the tape would have 
supported defendant’s assertion that he was under duress at the time he gave his statement), 
which ostensibly would have required a finding that the Tape lost by Barce and DeLello was 
of “apparent exculpatory value.”  The Court reasoned “We think that . . . the [Supreme Court 
in Bivins] was using ‘material’ in the traditional sense rather than as a term of art as employed 
by the Court in Youngblood.”  Id. at 1288.  They proceeded to announce a distinction between 
“potentially useful evidence” and “materially exculpatory evidence” without fleshing out the 
distinction. With no analysis other than that recounted infra at Part VII.B. (discussion of 
Trombetta application to Samek), the Court concluded that the lost Tape fell into the category 
of “potentially useful evidence” and did not satisfy Trombetta’s “apparent exculpatory value” 
requirement.  Id. at 1289.   
54I have found no reported cases in which the exculpatory value of evidence was this clear. 
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established.55  As a result, it is a rare, if non-existent, situation where lost or 
destroyed evidence is deemed clearly exculpatory by a fact finding court.  
E.  Framework for Understanding “Exculpatory Value” 
The key to a proper understanding of exculpatory value is not so much the 
distinctions between different levels of exculpatory value (i.e. potential v. certain), 
but the requirement that such value be “apparent” prior to loss or destruction of the 
evidence.56  The mere failure to preserve evidence which could have been subjected 
to tests which might have exonerated the defendant will not constitute a due process 
violation because the evidence had no exculpatory value that was apparent before its 
loss.  In the same way, there is no apparent exculpatory value to evidence that has 
been tested and is apparently inculpatory.  However, when the government fails to 
preserve evidence that has apparent potential to “cast doubt on the guilt of 
defendant,” such evidence has exculpatory value within the meaning of Trombetta.  
So long as its exculpatory value is apparent, this qualification as having exculpatory 
value applies regardless of the degree with which it is certain that the evidence will 
exculpate a defendant (i.e. certain or potential). 
VII.  WHEN DOES YOUNGBLOOD’S BAD FAITH REQUIREMENT APPLY TO FAILURE TO 
PRESERVE EVIDENCE CASES? 
Having concluded that the Tape lost by Barce and DeLello satisfies Trombetta’s 
exculpatory value requirement, it is necessary to determine whether satisfaction of 
Trombetta’s materiality test57 alone constitutes a violation of Samek’s right to due 
process or whether Samek must also prove bad faith under Youngblood to show a 
due process violation.  There are two tenable responses to this inquiry. 
A.  Approach #1  Bad Faith is a Required Element of All Failure to Preserve 
Evidence Claims 
One response is that Samek must prove the presence of bad faith under 
Youngblood. The First Circuit in United States v. Femia58 explained” [i]n 
Youngblood, the Court . . . added a third element” to Trombetta’s two pronged 
materiality test. Following Youngblood,  
[any] defendant who seeks to suppress evidence formerly in the 
government’s possession therefore must show that the government, in 
failing to preserve the evidence, (1) acted in bad faith when it destroyed 
evidence, which (2) possessed an apparent exculpatory value and, which 
(3) is to some extent irreplaceable.  Thus in missing evidence cases, the 
                                                                
55See State v. Okumura, 894 P.2d 80, 99 (Haw. 1995). 
56Youngblood “reemphasized Trombetta’s focus on whether the exculpatory value of the 
evidence was apparent before its destruction.”  State v. Leroux, 557 A.2d 1271, 1273 (Conn. 
App. Ct. 1989) (emphasis added). 
57This Article proceeds on the assumption that the evidence lost by Barce and DeLello is 
unobtainable from other sources. 
589 F.3d 990 (1st Cir. 1993).  
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presence or absence of good or bad faith by the government will be 
dispositive.59 
There are two major implications of this approach.  First, as noted by Femia, 
good or bad faith becomes relevant, if not dispositive, to the analysis of each and 
every case where the government fails to preserve evidence that has apparent 
exculpatory value.  Second, any determination that evidence lacks apparent 
exculpatory value60 becomes dispositive.61  Whenever the government fails to 
preserve evidence that has no apparent exculpatory value, the good or bad faith of 
police is not a consideration.   
B.  Approach #2 Bad Faith is Only Required When Evidence is Not Material Under 
Trombetta 
A different response is that Samek is not required to prove bad faith because the 
lost Tape had apparent exculpatory value.  Bad faith is only required when 
government agents fail to preserve evidence whose exculpatory value is 
indeterminate.  The Tenth Circuit demonstrated this approach in United States v. 
Bohl.62   
We first must determine whether Trombetta or Youngblood governs our 
analysis of [the defendants’] due process challenge.  This inquiry turns on 
                                                                
59Id. at 993-94. See, e.g., United States v. Rastelli, 870 F.2d 822, 833 (2d Cir. 1989); Jones 
v. McCaughtry, 965 F.2d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Malbrough, 922 F.2d 458, 
463 (8th Cir. 1990); People v. Muna, 1992 WL 245624, *3 (D. Guam App. Div. 1992); 
Maravilla v. United States, 901 F. Supp. 62, 68 (D.P.R. 1995). 
60See infra Part I. 
61This stands in contrast to Approach #2 which allows for the possibility that the failure to 
preserve evidence without apparent exculpatory value might rise to the level of a due process 
violation if bad faith is present. See supra discussion of Approach #2. 
6225 F.3d 904 (10th Cir. 1994); see also United States v. Jobson, 102 F.3d 214, 218 (6th 
Cir. 1996).  It is necessary to note that while Bohl correctly articulated this approach, it did not 
correctly apply the approach.  In Bohl, government agents failed to preserve steel tower legs 
whose chemical composition was central to the case against defendants Bell and Bohl.  The 
tower legs were destroyed after the government was explicitly and repeatedly placed on notice 
that Bell and Bohl wanted the legs preserved and believed they were exculpatory, and after the 
government was presented with objective, independent evidence which gave them reason to 
believe that further tests on the tower legs might lead to exculpatory evidence.  Bohl, 25 F.3d 
at 911.  The exculpatory value of the tower legs was apparent before their destruction.  More 
could be said than that “[the evidence] could have been subjected to tests the results of which 
might have exonerated the defendant.”  Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57.  As a result, the tower 
legs should have been recognized as having “apparent exculpatory value,” see infra Part VI 
(discussion of this value), and bad faith should not have been required to prove a due process 
violation. 
The Court in Bohl recognized the factual similarities between their case and United States 
v. Cooper, 983 F.2d 928 (9th Cir. 1993), (this recognition came during the discussion of bad 
faith), yet failed to follow Cooper’s analysis, see infra Part I.C., which would have lead to the 
conclusion that the tower legs did have apparent exculpatory value.  Following the approach 
they articulate, had the Bohl Court reached this conclusion, they would have found a due 
process violation without requiring a finding of bad faith. 
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the import of the destroyed materials.  To invoke Trombetta, a defendant 
must demonstrate that the government destroyed evidence possessing an 
‘apparent’ exculpatory value.  However, to trigger the Youngblood test, all 
that need be shown is that the government destroyed “potentially useful 
evidence.”  The Court in Youngblood defined “potentially useful 
evidence” as evidence of which “no more can be said than that it could 
have been subjected to tests the results of which might have exonerated 
the defendant.” Because our review of the record concludes that the [lost 
evidence] offered only potentially useful evidence for [defendants’] 
defense, we apply the rule of Youngblood rather than Trombetta.63 
Applying Bohl’s approach to Samek, because the Tape had apparent exculpatory 
value64 Youngblood is not triggered and bad faith is not relevant to a determination of 
whether Samek’s due process rights were violated.   
There are two major implications of this approach.  First, a due process violation 
may be shown even where the police acted in good faith so long as the evidence has 
apparent exculpatory value.  Second, a due process violation may be shown even 
where the exculpatory value of the evidence was not apparent at the time the 
evidence was lost or destroyed.   
C.  Approach #1 Correctly Applies Trombetta and Youngblood 
The implications of Approach #2 are not consistent with Trombetta and 
Youngblood.  First, it is not correct that a due process violation may be shown even 
where the police acted in good faith.  Trombetta itself indicated that good faith was a 
separate and distinct reason for finding no due process violation.  Moreover, 
Youngblood read Trombetta this way.  If a due process violation cannot occur when 
government agents act in good faith, then bad faith must necessarily be a part of any 
due process violation.  Consequently, Approach #1’s inclusion of Youngblood’s bad 
faith requirement in every assessment of a failure to preserve evidence case is 
proper.  Second, and also weighing against Approach #2, a due process violation 
may not be shown  where the exculpatory value of the evidence was not apparent at 
the time it was lost or destroyed.  Youngblood indicated that its bad faith requirement 
extended, rather than replaced, Trombetta’s requirement that the evidence have 
apparent exculpatory value.  Youngblood explained, “we made clear in Trombetta 
that the exculpatory value of the evidence must be apparent ‘before the evidence [is] 
destroyed.’“ By contrast, Youngblood was not able to show “that the police knew the 
semen samples would have exculpated him when they failed to [preserve it].”65  
Moreover, Youngblood declared, “The presence or absence of bad faith . . . must 
necessarily turn on the police’s knowledge of the exculpatory value of the evidence 
at the time it was lost or destroyed,” and justified the bad faith requirement on the 
ground that it “limits the extent of the police’s obligation to preserve evidence . . . to 
those cases in which the police themselves by their conduct indicate that the 
evidence could form a basis for exonerating the defendant.”66  Police conduct would 
                                                                
63United States v. Bohl, 25 F.3d at 910 (citations omitted). 
64See infra Part I.C. 
65Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 56 n.* (citations omitted). 
66Id. at 56 n.* & 58. 
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not indicate an awareness that the evidence could form a basis for exonerating the 
defendant if they themselves were not aware that the evidence had apparent 
exculpatory value.  Approach #1 does not forget Trombetta’s materiality 
requirement, but combines it with the bad faith requirement.  This is workable and 
consistent with both Trombetta and Youngblood.  
Approach #1 correctly applies Trombetta and Youngblood.  Accordingly, to 
prove a due process violation, Samek must show that Barce and DeLello acted in bad 
faith when they lost the Tape. 
VIII.  WHAT IS THE SUBSTANCE OF BAD FAITH?67 
To prove a due process violation, Samek must prove that Barce and DeLello 
acted in bad faith.  However, to properly assess evidence offered to prove the 
presence of bad faith a court must first determine what is necessary to establish bad 
faith.  Though the question,  “What constitutes bad faith . . . ?”68 was first posed over 
a decade ago by Justice Blackmun in his Youngblood dissent, there is still no clear 
answer to the question.69 
One reason such an answer has not been reached is that discussion of the 
substance of the bad faith requirement has been overshadowed by concern over 
whether Youngblood adequately preserves a defendant’s constitutional right to due 
process.  Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion to Youngblood, recognized, 
“there may well be cases in which the defendant is unable to prove that the State 
acted in bad faith but in which the loss or destruction of evidence is nonetheless so 
critical to the defense as to make a criminal trial unfair.”70  Justice Steven’s due 
process concern gave rise to a lengthy dialogue among legal scholars, the majority of 
whom conclude that Youngblood’s bad faith requirement falls short of guaranteeing 
due process to criminal defendants.71 
                                                                
67All of the discussion in Part III is predicated on the assumption that the elements of 
Trombetta’s two prong materiality test, that the evidence have apparent exculpatory value and 
be unobtainable from other sources, have already been proven. 
68Id. at 66 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“I also doubt that the ‘bad faith’ standard creates the 
bright-line rule sought by the majority. . . . the line between ‘good faith’ and ‘bad faith’ is 
anything but bright, and the majority’s formulation may well create more questions than it 
answers. What constitutes bad faith for these purposes?”). 
69Currently, courts continue to struggle with the definition of bad faith.  In June 1998 the 
Court in Rodriguez v. State, No. 03-97-00180-CR, 1998 WL 303873, at *4 (Tex. Ct. App. 
June 11, 1998), reaffirmed that “[w]hat constitutes “bad faith” is not altogether clear from the 
case law.” 
70Id. at 61 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
71See generally Sarah M. Bernstein, Note, Fourteenth Amendment-Police Failure to 
Preserve Evidence and Erosion of the Due Process Right to a Fair Trial, 80 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1256 (1990); Albert M. T. Finch, III, Note, “Oops!  We Forgot to Put it in the 
Refrigerator”: DNA Identification and the State’s Duty to Preserve Evidence, 25 J. MARSHALL 
L. REV. 809 (1992); B. W. Gordon, Jr., Note, Constitutional Law-Due Process-Failure of 
Police to Preserve Evidence Held Not to Be a Denial of Due Process of Law Absent 
Defendant’s Showing Bad Faith on Part of Police: Arizona v. Youngblood, 109 S. Ct. 333 
(1988), 20 CUMB. L. REV. 211 (1989); Linda Gensler Kaufmann, Arizona v. Youngblood, State 
Advantage in Criminal Proceedings: the Ghost Is Real and the Haunting Continues, 14 OKLA. 
CITY U. L. REV. 665 (1989); Matthew H. Lembke, Note, The Role of Police Culpability in 
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While the due process problem identified by Justice Stevens is important, the 
substance of the bad faith requirement is a more immediate concern.  Despite the 
criticism of courts and academics, a majority of the Supreme Court in Youngblood 
necessarily found that the bad faith requirement affords criminal defendants due 
process.  More importantly, in the decade following Youngblood, the Court has 
offered no indication that it plans to reconsider or alter the bad faith requirement.  
Admitting that the requirement is here to stay, an understanding of its substance is 
crucial to its proper application.  This Article, therefore, focuses on the substance of 
the bad faith requirement, assuming that at a base level, the requirement does provide 
due process.  
Another reason there has been no answer to the question “what constitutes bad 
faith?” is that the majority of Trombetta/Youngblood cases involve evidence which 
had no apparent exculpatory value.72  Once this determination is reached, the 
presence or absence of bad faith becomes moot, because without apparent 
exculpatory value there can be no due process violation.73  Moreover, those courts 
that try to explore bad faith are fundamentally handicapped in their attempts because 
bad faith and exculpatory value are so intertwined;74 when there is no exculpatory 
value bad faith cannot be fully explored.  Next, there is no clear definition of bad 
faith because those courts who have had occasion to consider the requirement have 
adopted different approaches to its application.75  Finally, there are a very limited 
number of cases where courts have found the presence of bad faith.76  As a result, 
there is little opportunity to observe the affirmative character of bad faith. 
                                                          
Leon and Youngblood, 76 VA. L. REV. 1213 (1990); Willis C. Moore, Note, Arizona v. 
Youngblood: Does the Criminal Defendant Lose His Right to Due Process When the State 
Loses Exculpatory Evidence?, 5 TOURO L. REV. 309 (1989, 90); Karen Carlson Paul, Note, 
Destruction of Exculpatory Evidence:  Bad Faith Standard Erodes Due Process Rights, 
Arizona v. Youngblood, 109 S. Ct. 333 (1988), 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1181 (1989); Trish Peyser 
Perlmutter, Arizona v. Youngblood, 109 S.Ct. 333 (1988),  24 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 529 
(1989).  But see Gavin Frost, Arizona v. Youngblood  Adherence to a Bad Faith Threshold 
Test Before Recognizing a Deprivation of Due Process, 34 S.D. L. REV. 303 at 407 (1989) 
(praising Youngblood as effectively securing due process for criminal defendants). 
72See generally, People v. Hines, 938 P.2d 388, 419-20 (Cal. 1997); People v. Beeler, 891 
P.2d 153, 165-67 (Cal. 1995); People v. Freeman, 8 Cal. 4th 450, 456 (1994); People v. 
Hardy, 825 P.2d 781, 827 (Cal. 1992); People v. Zapien, 846 P.2d 704, 722-23 (Cal. 1993). 
73See supra Part II.C. for discussion of apparent exculpatory value. 
74See Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 56 n.* (“The presence or absence of bad faith  . . . must 
necessarily turn on the police’s knowledge of the exculpatory value of the evidence . . . .”). 
75See supra Part III.A - C. 
76I have found only three post-Youngblood cases where bad faith was present.  See United 
States v. Cooper, 983 F.2d 928, 931 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding bad faith because the government 
“[left] unchallenged the district court’s conclusion that the police acted in bad faith by 
allowing the [evidence] to be destroyed while assuring [the defendant] and his attorney that it 
was being held as evidence”); United States v. Bohl, 25 F.3d 904, 911-13 (10th Cir. 1994) 
(finding bad faith because the facts and evidence in the case, “in the absence of any innocent 
explanation offered by the government, [gave] rise to a logical conclusion of bad faith”); 
Stuart v. State, 907 P.3d 783, 793 (Idaho 1995) (“We believe that the failure to provide 
discovery regarding the taped phone call is a sufficiently proximate cause of the destruction of 
the phone log evidence so as to rise to the level of bad faith under Youngblood.”). 
16https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol48/iss2/6
2000] HERE TODAY, GONE TOMORROW 351 
There are three main approaches to defining bad faith.  The labels attached to 
each approach are my own creation and are not used by any court.  I believe, 
however, that the labels effectively represent the approaches to defining bad faith as 
revealed by different courts’ analyses of the problem. 
A.  Conclusive Presumption Approach 
The conclusive presumption approach, while recognizing that bad faith is a 
required element of Samek’s due process claim, would find that Samek has already 
met his burden of proof to establish a due process violation.  This is because “[t]he 
presence or absence of bad faith by the police for purposes of the Due Process 
Clause must necessarily turn on the police’s knowledge of the exculpatory value of 
the evidence at the time it was lost or destroyed.”77  When the exculpatory value of 
the evidence is clear, then subsequent loss or destruction of the evidence 
conclusively indicates the presence of bad faith.  The implication, applied to Samek,  
is that Barce and DeLello realized that the Tape could help Samek and then “lost” it 
to prevent Samek from benefitting from that help.  In other words, Barce and 
DeLello indicated by their conduct “that the evidence could form a basis for 
exonerating the defendant.”78  Once a conclusive presumption of bad faith arises, the 
State has no opportunity to demonstrate the absence of bad faith and a defendant 
need not prove anything further.  Since Barce and DeLello were aware of the 
exculpatory value of the Tape when they lost it, bad faith is conclusively presumed. 
This approach to bad faith is simply an alternate formulation of Approach #2 
discussed supra in Part II.B.  Rather than concluding that Youngblood’s bad faith 
requirement simply doesn’t apply when evidence has apparent exculpatory value, 
courts adopting this approach conclusively presume that bad faith is present in any 
situation where evidence with apparent exculpatory value is lost or destroyed.  The 
arguments made against Approach #2, supra in Part II.C., apply here as well.   
This approach was rejected in United States v. Lov-It Creamery, Inc.79 The Court 
“[did] not read [Youngblood’s] footnote as creating a rule that if evidence has 
apparent exculpatory value at the time it is lost or destroyed, then an inference of bad 
faith arises.”80  The Court argued that such a reading placed undue emphasis on the 
footnote which was meant “to emphasize that the measure of the exculpatory value 
of the evidence must be made with reference to the time it is destroyed, not, for 
example, after other evidence is uncovered that may change the exculpatory nature 
                                                                
77Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 56 n.*. 
78Id. at 58. 
79704 F. Supp. 1532 (E.D. Wis. 1989), modified by United States v. Lov-It Creamery, Inc., 
895 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1990). 
80Id. at 1548. Note: the word “inference” as used by the Court in Lov-It Creamery, Inc., 
has the same meaning as the term “conclusive presumption” that I use in my analysis.  An 
inference is “a truth or proposition drawn from another which is supposed or admitted to be 
true.  A process of reasoning by which a fact or proposition sought to be established is 
deduced as a logical consequence from other facts, or a state of facts, already proved or 
admitted.  A logical and reasonable conclusion of a fact not presented by direct evidence but 
which, by process of logic and reason, a trier of fact may conclude exists from the established 
facts.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 778 (6th ed. 1990).   
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of already-destroyed evidence.”81  The Lov-It Creamery Court rightly concluded that 
while a government agent’s awareness of the exculpatory value of the evidence is 
“certainly relevant to whether there was bad faith,” it cannot be the only measure.82 
B.  Rebuttable Presumption Approach 
Because an inquiry into bad faith “must necessarily turn on the [government’s] 
knowledge of the exculpatory value at the time it was lost or destroyed,”83 and 
because the Tape Barce and DeLello lost was apparently exculpatory, this approach 
to bad faith establishes a rebuttable presumption of bad faith in Samek’s favor.84  
This presumption can be overturned upon the showing of sufficient proof by Barce 
and DeLello that bad faith was not a factor behind the loss or destruction of the Tape.  
United States v. Bohl85 demonstrates the rebuttable presumption approach.  After 
concluding that the lost evidence had potential exculpatory value,86 the Court 
effectively established a rebuttable presumption of bad faith.  They proceeded to 
analyze the evidence for an “innocent explanation” of the destruction which could 
rebut the presumption.  They concluded that the evidence on record, “in the absence 
of any innocent explanation offered by the government, [gave] rise to a logical 
conclusion of bad faith.”87   
In its discussion, the Court in Bohl analyzed prior caselaw to identify what sorts 
of evidence might sufficiently rebut a presumption of bad faith.  First, negligent loss 
or destruction has been sufficient to rebut bad faith.88  In Youngblood, the failure of 
                                                                
81Lov-It Creamery, 704 F. Supp. at 1548. 
82Id. 
83Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 56 n.*. 
84The rebuttable presumption approach, while placing heavy emphasis on Youngblood’s 
footnote * avoids Lov-It Creamery’s criticism of the conclusive presumption approach’s 
complete reliance on the footnote, see supra Part III.A., because it doesn’t use the footnote as 
the “only” measure of bad faith. 
8525 F.3d 904 (10th Cir. 1994).  The facts of United States v. Bohl are recounted supra 
note 61. 
86It is necessary to remember that although the Bohl Court says that they are using the 
term “potential exculpatory value” to refer to evidence of which “no more can be said than 
that it could be subjected to tests the results of which might have exonerated the defendant,” 
the destroyed evidence in Bohl does meet the standard of “apparent exculpatory value” that I 
discussed supra at Part I. Both the Bohl Court and I believe that bad faith is a required element 
given our determinations of exculpatory value.  As a result, even though the Bohl court 
mistakenly applies Trombetta and Youngblood in their analysis of the case, their use of the 
rebuttable presumption approach appropriately demonstrates how the approach would operate 
within the correct Trombetta/Youngblood framework discussed supra at Part II.  
87Id. at 913. 
88To demonstrate “negligent loss or destruction” that is sufficient to rebut bad faith, the 
State must be able to demonstrate the method or manner in which the evidence was lost or 
destroyed. For example, in United States v. Femia, 9 F.3d 990 (1st Cir. 1993), the State 
demonstrated that evidence was destroyed because “Agent Lively incorrectly failed to heed [a] 
cross-referencing notation linking the Perea file [which contained evidence relating to Femia’s 
case] to Femia’s file, which should have alerted him that the Tape recordings in Perea’s file 
were to be preserved pending the disposition of Femia’s case.”  Id. at 991-92. Such a showing 
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police to preserve evidence was “at worst . . . described as negligent,”89 and no bad 
faith was found.  Subsequent cases have consistently affirmed negligence as 
rebutting a finding of bad faith.90  Though unclear, it also appears as though gross 
negligence is sufficient to rebut bad faith.91  Second, a showing that the evidence was 
destroyed “pursuant to standard procedure” is the most common way that bad faith is 
rebutted.  “[C]ourts have held that the government does not necessarily engage in 
bad faith conduct when the destruction of evidence results from a standard procedure 
employed by the governmental department or agency regarding the disposal of the 
evidence at least when there is adequate documentation of the destroyed evidence.”92  
Following its examination, the Court concluded,  
                                                          
of negligence is sufficient to rebut the presumption of bad faith.  It is not, however, enough 
simply to say, “we don’t know what happened to the evidence and so it must have been 
negligently lost.” 
89Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58. 
90See, e.g., United States v. Bohl, 25 F.3d 904, 912 (10th Cir.1994); Holdren v. Legursky, 
16 F.3d 57, 60 (4th Cir.1994) (police investigators’ negligence does not indicate bad faith); 
Montgomery v. Greer, 956 F.2d 677, 680-81 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding that due process was not 
violated when police’s loss of evidence was both “unprofessional” and “slip-shod” because 
“mere negligence, without more, does not amount to a constitutional violation”); Collins v. 
Commonwealth, 951 S.W.2d 569, 573 (Ky. 1997) (“[M]ere negligence simply does not rise to 
the level of bad faith required by Youngblood.”) (citation omitted).  But see Youngblood, 488 
U.S. at 66 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (criticizing a rule that allows negligence to rebut bad 
faith Justice Blackmun asked, “Does ‘good faith police work’ require a certain minimum of 
diligence, or will a lazy officer, who does not walk the few extra steps to the evidence 
refrigerator, be considered to be acting in good faith?”). 
91See  Barbara J. Flagg,  “Was Blind, but Now I See”:  White Race Consciousness and the 
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent,  91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 987 n.120 (1993) (“The Court 
has left open the possibility that ‘something less than intentional conduct, such as recklessness 
or ‘gross negligence’ is enough to trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause.”)(citation 
omitted).  See, e.g., United States v. Femia, 9 F.3d 990, 992 (1st Cir. 1993) (gross negligence 
in handing evidence did not constitute violation of due process); United States v. Jobson, 102 
F.3d 214, 218 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding no bad faith when the loss of evidence was attributable 
to negligence, possibly even gross negligence); Perlmutter, supra note 71, at 529 (“By 
establishing a bad faith test for lost evidence, the Court concluded that even gross negligence 
on the part of the police should go unsanctioned.”).  But see People v. Baca, 562 P.2d 411, 414 
n.5 (Colo. 1977), (holding that under some circumstances gross negligence may be tantamount 
to bad faith); People v. Newberry, 638 N.E.2d 1196, 1203 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (“[I]t would 
appear to be a reasonable assumption that conduct amounting to ‘gross negligence,’ . . . be 
deemed to be tantamount to bad faith on the part of the State.”). 
92United States v. Bohl, 25 F.3d 904, 912-13 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. 
Gibson, 963 F.2d 708, 711 (5th Cir. 1992) (United States Border Patrol agents “routinely” 
destroy seized controlled substances sixty days after informing the United States Attorney 
about the seizure, pursuant to agency procedure)); United States v. Belden, 957 F.2d 671, 673-
74 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that cutting of marijuana plants pursuant to routine practice due to 
lack of storage capacity does not rise to the level of bad faith), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 882 
(1992)).  But see Gordon, supra note 71, at 223 (expressing fear that this rule gives the police 
free reign “to establish arbitrary guidelines requiring all evidence, including that which might 
be useful to the defense, to be destroyed routinely in order to preclude its disclosure”). 
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What this authority teaches is that even if the government destroys or 
facilitates the disposition of evidence knowing of its potentially 
exculpatory value, there might exist innocent explanations for the 
government’s conduct that are reasonable under the circumstances to 
negate any [presumption] of bad faith.  Although the defendant has the 
burden of proving the bad faith of the government in destroying the 
evidence . . . we note that the government here offers no reasonable 
rational or good faith explanation for the destruction of the evidence.93  
Based on the Bohl analysis and the facts originally provided in Samek, Barce and 
DeLello will be unable to rebut a presumption of bad faith.  Because they do not 
know how they lost the Tape (they do not even know who lost the Tape), they cannot 
claim that the loss was the result of “mere negligence.”94 Moreover, they have no 
argument that the Tape was destroyed according to standard police procedure.  This 
is especially true given that Barce and DeLello did not work through normal 
channels by placing the Tape into evidence. 
Aside from the two categories defined in Bohl, it is unclear what else might 
sufficiently rebut bad faith.  One possibility is that a state actor’s declaration that he 
did not act intentionally, or in bad faith, might rebut a presumption of bad faith.  
Though this possibility has not been explicitly addressed by any court, courts do 
seem to take into account whether or not a state actor does make such a declaration 
when performing their bad faith analysis.  The Samek Court placed great weight on a 
government agent’s testimony that “the [evidence] was simply misplaced, not 
purposefully destroyed” and then used this statement to effectually equate the loss 
with negligence.95 Allowing this sort of testimony to rebut bad faith would move the 
rebuttable presumption approach closer toward the no presumption approach 
discussed infra Part III.C.96 
In the event that State actors are able to rebut a presumption of bad faith, the 
burden shifts back to the defendant who must make an affirmative showing of bad 
faith to prove a due process violation.97 
C.  No Presumption Approach 
The no presumption approach requires Samek to affirmatively prove that Barce 
and DeLello acted with “official animus” or a “conscious effort to suppress 
                                                                
93Bohl, 25 F.3d at 913. 
94As discussed infra at note 93, the Samek Court did ultimately conclude that the loss was 
the result of negligence.  This was not because the method of loss revealed negligence.  
Instead, the conclusion was based on DeLello’s testimony that he “misplaced” the tape and did 
not “destroy” it.  See Samek v. State, 688 N.E.2d 1286, 1289 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). 
95Id. 
96Commentators have expressed concern about the possibility that a State actor’s 
statement could be enough to rebut bad faith, “[a]nother danger . . . is the likelihood that the 
court will without question accept an agent’s statement that he destroyed the evidence in good 
faith.” Kaufmann, supra note 71, at 687-88. 
97Presumably, this independent showing of bad faith would resemble the sort of bad faith 
showing required by the no presumption approach discussed infra in Part III.C. 
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exculpatory evidence” when they lost the Tape.98  If they did not intend to deprive 
Samek of exculpatory evidence or otherwise harm him, bad faith is not established 
and there is no due process violation.  
This approach to bad faith was first articulated by United States v. 
Zambrana99 prior to the Court’s explicit articulation of the bad faith requirement in 
Youngblood.  It is based upon a factor considered by the Court in Trombetta.  
Holding that there was no due process violation, the Court noted, “[t]he record 
contains no allegation of official animus towards [defendants] or of a conscious 
effort to suppress exculpatory evidence.”100  Courts like Zambrana cite Trombetta as 
though this finding was essential to its holding101 and created an absolute 
requirement of these things in order to find bad faith.  This representation is 
inaccurate.  The absence of these motives was simply one factor which the Court 
examined to determine that bad faith was not present.  Clearly, bad faith is present 
when State agents lose or destroy evidence with “official animus” or “conscious 
effort to suppress,” but bad faith is not necessarily absent when State agents lose or 
destroy evidence and independent proof of these specific motives is lacking. 
The no presumption approach is troubling for several other reasons.  First, it has 
not be re-evaluated in light of Youngblood.102  Given that Youngblood is the seminal 
case on the issue of bad faith, it seems odd that there is no discussion of how the 
reasoning in Youngblood might impact the reasoning of the no presumption 
approach.  An obvious point for discussion might be that Youngblood doesn’t cite or 
articulate the Trombetta factor that the no presumption approach is based upon.  It 
seems that the Youngblood Court would have highlighted it had their intention been 
to create an absolute rule from that factor.  Moreover, Justice Blackmun, who sat on 
the panel that decided Youngblood, wasn’t himself clear that bad faith required such 
intentional conduct.  He asked, “Does a defendant have to show actual 
malice. . . ?”103 
The Youngblood decision is not entirely void of support for the no presumption 
approach.  The Court does make a single reference to acts of “intention” citing 
United States v. Marion104 in its discussion of “the importance for constitutional 
purposes of good or bad faith on the part of the Government when the claim is based 
                                                                
98See United States v. Jobson, 102 F.3d 214, 218 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Trombetta, 467 
U.S. at 488). 
99841 F.2d 1320, 1341-42 (7th Cir. March 7, 1988) (“[T]he loss or destruction of evidence 
does not implicate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment absent ‘official 
animus’ or a ‘conscious effort to suppress exculpatory evidence.’“). 
100Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488. 
101Zambrana, 841 F.2d at 1341-42 (holding that “the loss or destruction of evidence does 
not implicate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment absent ‘official animus’ 
or a ‘conscious effort to suppress exculpatory evidence’“). 
102Zambrana, 841 F.2d at 1320, outlined the no presumption bad faith formulation in 
March of 1988 while Youngblood was not decided until November 29, 1988. 
103Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 66 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
104404 U.S. 307 (1971). 
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on loss of evidence attributable to the Government.”105  This sole reference to 
intention, however, seems insufficient to support a definition of “bad faith” that 
requires an intentional act done with “official animus” or “conscious effort.”  This is 
especially true given that Marion is cited to support a general bad faith standard but 
is not applied in the Court’s analysis of the Youngblood case.  In contrast to Marion,  
Youngblood discusses bad faith without using volitional words like “intent” and 
“purpose.”  The Court said that bad faith occurs where “the police themselves by 
very conduct indicate that the evidence could form a basis for exonerating 
defendant.”106  This statement opens up the possibility that in some instances 
conduct, rather than the sort of mindset or intent required by the no presumption 
approach, can indicate bad faith.  For example, the Arizona Court of Appeals cited 
Trombetta and Youngblood to support the proposition that “in the context of a due 
process analysis, the Supreme Court has made clear that ‘bad faith’ has less to do 
with the actor’s intent than with the actor’s knowledge that the evidence was 
‘constitutionally material.’”107  
Samek offers no direct evidence that Barce or DeLello were motivated by 
“official animus” or “conscious effort to suppress exculpatory evidence.”108  There is 
some circumstantial evidence that might support such a motivation.  Samek could 
argue that Barce’s instruction to DeLello not to place the Tape into evidence 
demonstrates bad faith, but it seems unlikely that this conduct, in the absence of 
additional motive proving evidence, would be sufficient to demonstrate the required 
mindset.  This was the finding of the Indiana Court of Appeals.  They indicated that 
circumstantial evidence in the form of Barce’s instruction not to place the Tape into 
evidence was not sufficient to support a finding of bad faith because it was not 
conclusive of Barce’s mindset.  The Court suggested that absent direct evidence of 
bad faith, the only sort of circumstantial evidence that might rise to the level of bad 
faith would have been an affirmative instruction to destroy the Tape.  The Court 
concluded, “[t]he record reveals that though Barce told DeLello not to place the Tape 
in evidence, he did not tell DeLello to destroy the tape.  DeLello testified that the 
tape was simply misplaced, not purposefully destroyed.  This evidence does not 
prove ‘conscious doing of wrong’ . . . .”109  Theoretically, Samek has the opportunity 
to discover this additional motive proving evidence (if it exists).  Practically, 
however, even if the evidence exists, the opportunity is non-existent.  “The defendant 
is ill-suited to inquire into subjective good faith or bad faith of the police.  The most 
relevant evidence of police good or bad faith is apt to lie within the control of the 
police, and police officers are highly unlikely to cooperate voluntarily with 
defendants by accusing fellow officers of misconduct.”110  “As Justice Blackmun 
suggested in dissent, the ‘inherent difficulty a defendant would have in obtaining 
                                                                
105Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57. 
106Id. at 58. 
107State v. Walker, 914 P.2d 1320, 1330 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996). 
108Direct evidence might include things such as an admission by either Barce or DeLello 
that one or both of these motives were present.  
109Samek, 688 N.E.2d at 1289. 
110The Supreme Court, 1988 Term, 103 HARV. L. REV. 40, 166 (1989). 
22https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol48/iss2/6
2000] HERE TODAY, GONE TOMORROW 357 
evidence to show a lack of good faith’ makes [such a] test unworkable and 
unprincipled.”111  
D.  Bad Faith is Best Defined by the Rebuttable Presumption Approach  
The rebuttable presumption approach represents the best way to define bad faith.  
The approach is consistent with Youngblood because it acknowledges footnote *, 
that bad faith “must necessarily turn on the [government’s] knowledge of the 
exculpatory value of the evidence at the time it was lost or destroyed”112 without 
placing undue emphasis on it.113  The approach provides a workable definition of bad 
faith for both defendants and government agents.  Unlike the no presumption 
approach, the rebuttable presumption approach does not place an impossible burden 
on a defendant by requiring him to prove the subjective mindset of government 
agents.114  The rebuttable presumption approach does what the conclusive 
presumption does not.  It allows the government an opportunity to demonstrate that 
bad faith was not a part of the loss or destruction of evidence.115 This opportunity is 
consistent with Youngblood’s goal of limiting the extent of the government’s 
obligation to preserve evidence.116  At the same time, the rebuttable presumption 
approach fulfills Youngblood’s goal of protecting a defendant when a government 
agent’s conduct affirmatively demonstrates that the evidence could form a basis for 
exonerating the defendant but evidence conclusive of that agent’s subjective mindset 
is unavailable.117 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
The Indiana Court of Appeals made three common mistakes when it applied 
Trombetta and Youngblood in Samek v. State.118  The first mistake they made was to 
conclude that  lost evidence does not have “apparent exculpatory value” unless it is 
certain to cast doubt on the guilt of the defendant.  This mistake led the Court to 
conclude that the Tape lost by Barce and DeLello did not have apparent exculpatory 
value because it did not “prove that Jacobsen committed the burglary instead of 
Samek.”119  This mistake could have been avoided if the Court had properly focused 
                                                                
111Id. (quoting Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 66-67 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). 
112Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 56 n.*. 
113See analysis of conclusive presumption approach supra Part III.A. 
114See supra Part III.C. 
115See supra Part III.A & B. 
116See Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58.  “We think that requiring a defendant to show bad faith 
on the part of the police both limits the extent of the police’s obligation to preserve evidence 
to reasonable bounds and confines it to that class of cases where the interests of justice most 
clearly require it, i.e., those cases in which the police themselves by their conduct indicate that 
the evidence could form a basis for exonerating the defendant.”). 
117Id. 
118688 N.E.2d 1286 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). 
119Id. at 1289.  (“We hold this tape to be potentially useful evidence, not material 
exculpatory evidence.  Without the identification of the speaker and evidence as to the 
circumstances surrounding the making of the tape, the tape does not prove that Jacobsen 
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on whether the exculpatory value of the lost evidence was apparent prior to its loss 
rather than on the degree of certainty with which the evidence would exculpate the 
defendant.  So long as its exculpatory value is apparent to government agents, any 
evidence that tends to cast doubt on the guilt of the defendant has apparent 
exculpatory value.  
One reason that courts continually botch their analysis of “apparent exculpatory 
value” is that they use the label “potentially exculpatory” in different ways.  Some 
use the label to refer to the sort of evidence lost in Youngblood of which “no more 
can be said than that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might 
have exonerated the defendant.”120  This sort of evidence does not meet the “apparent 
exculpatory value” standard because the people who lose this evidence are not aware 
of any exculpatory value before they lose it.  By contrast, a number of courts (i.e. the 
9th Circuit in Cooper) use the label “potentially exculpatory” to refer evidence that 
has exculpatory value, but whose exculpatory potential is less than certain (i.e. the 
evidence may cast doubt on guilt but is not certain to prove innocence).  So long as 
the exculpatory value of this sort of evidence is apparent before the evidence is lost 
or destroyed, the materiality standard of “apparent exculpatory value” is met.  
The Indiana Court of Appeals made a second common mistake by requiring 
proof of bad faith only when the lost or destroyed evidence does not have apparent 
exculpatory value.  The Court required Samek to prove bad faith because of their 
conclusion that the Tape did not have apparent exculpatory value.121 Had they 
realized that the Tape did have apparent exculpatory value, they presumably would 
have found a due process violation without requiring bad faith.  This result would not 
have been proper or consistent with Youngblood.  This second mistake could have 
been avoided if the Court had recognized that Youngblood’s bad faith requirement 
applies to all failure to preserve evidence cases. 
The Indiana Court of Appeals made its third and final mistake because it did not 
know the substance of Youngblood’s bad faith requirement.  Believing that the 
requirement could only be met by an independent demonstration that government 
agents consciously intended to suppress exculpatory evidence or acted with official 
animus toward the defendant the Court determined that Samek failed to prove bad 
faith because he could not show that Barce and DeLello purposefully destroyed the 
Tape.122  This mistaken conclusion could have been avoided if the Court had applied 
                                                          
committed the burglary instead of Samek . . .  The tape would be potentially useful because 
with proper identification, verification, and supporting evidence the tape might have helped to 
exonerate Samek.”) 
120Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57. 
121Id. (“[W]hen the evidence at issue falls within the definition of material exculpatory 
evidence, the defendant need not establish bad faith in order to prove a due process violation. 
Bad faith is relevant only when the evidence merely meets the definition of potentially useful 
evidence.”). 
122Samek, 688 N.E.2d 1286.  (“The record reveals that though Barce told DeLello not to 
place the Tape in evidence, he did not tell DeLello to destroy the Tape. DeLello testified that 
the Tape was simply misplaced, not purposefully destroyed.  This evidence does not prove 
‘conscious doing of wrong,’ . . . .  We, therefore, hold that Samek has failed to show that the 
State’s failure to preserve the Tape was done in bad faith.”). 
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the rebuttable presumption approach to bad faith.123  Whenever apparently 
exculpatory evidence is lost or destroyed the rebuttable presumption approach shifts 
the burden of showing an innocent explanation for the loss or destruction to the 
government.  Bad faith is commonly rebutted where the evidence is lost or destroyed 
as a result of mere negligence or where the evidence was destroyed pursuant to 
standard procedure. 
To avoid making any of the three mistakes made by the Indiana Court of Appeals 
and countless other courts like them, a court applying Trombetta and 
Youngblood must know three things.  First, they must understand what it means for 
evidence to have “apparent exculpatory value.” Specifically, they must focus their 
attention on whether any exculpatory value is apparent while at the same time 
recognizing that evidence with such value need not go so far as to conclusively 
“prove” a defendant’s innocence.  Second, they must apply Youngblood’s bad faith 
requirement to all cases where the government has failed to preserve evidence.  
Finally, a court should apply the rebuttable presumption approach as the most 
effective method of determining whether bad faith is present. 
                                                                
123The rebuttable presumption approach is discussed supra at Part III.B & D. 
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